On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many to may buyer seller markets (2017)
Fonte: International Journal of Game Theory. Unidade: FEA
Assuntos: EQUILÍBRIO ECONÔMICO, COMPETIÇÃO ECONÔMICA
ABNT
PÉREZ-CASTRILLO, J. David e SOTOMAYOR, Marilda Antonia de Oliveira. On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many to may buyer seller markets. International Journal of Game Theory, v. no 2017, n. 4, p. 1137-1161, 2017Tradução . . Disponível em: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0573-y. Acesso em: 20 out. 2025.APA
Pérez-Castrillo, J. D., & Sotomayor, M. A. de O. (2017). On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many to may buyer seller markets. International Journal of Game Theory, no 2017( 4), 1137-1161. doi:10.1007/s00182-017-0573-yNLM
Pérez-Castrillo JD, Sotomayor MA de O. On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many to may buyer seller markets [Internet]. International Journal of Game Theory. 2017 ; no 2017( 4): 1137-1161.[citado 2025 out. 20 ] Available from: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0573-yVancouver
Pérez-Castrillo JD, Sotomayor MA de O. On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many to may buyer seller markets [Internet]. International Journal of Game Theory. 2017 ; no 2017( 4): 1137-1161.[citado 2025 out. 20 ] Available from: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0573-y