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Artigo de periodico
Mergers and acquisitions with conditional and unconditional ofers (2020)
Gomes, Armando; Maldonado, Wilfredo Fernando Leiva
Source: International Journal of Game Theory. Unidade: FEA
Assunto: ECONOMIA
A citação é gerada automaticamente e pode não estar totalmente de acordo com as normas
ABNT
GOMES, Armando e MALDONADO, Wilfredo Fernando Leiva. Mergers and acquisitions with conditional and unconditional ofers. International Journal of Game Theory, v. 49, n. 3, p. 773-800, 2020Tradução . . Disponível em: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00720-6. Acesso em: 20 out. 2025.
APA
Gomes, A., & Maldonado, W. F. L. (2020). Mergers and acquisitions with conditional and unconditional ofers. International Journal of Game Theory, 49( 3), 773-800. doi:10.1007/s00182-020-00720-6
NLM
Gomes A, Maldonado WFL. Mergers and acquisitions with conditional and unconditional ofers [Internet]. International Journal of Game Theory. 2020 ; 49( 3): 773-800.[citado 2025 out. 20 ] Available from: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00720-6
Vancouver
Gomes A, Maldonado WFL. Mergers and acquisitions with conditional and unconditional ofers [Internet]. International Journal of Game Theory. 2020 ; 49( 3): 773-800.[citado 2025 out. 20 ] Available from: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00720-6
Artigo de periodico
Mergers and acquisitions with conditional and unconditional offers (2020)
Gomes, Armando; Maldonado, Wilfredo
Source: International Journal of Game Theory. Unidade: FEA
Subjects: FUSÃO E AQUISIÇÃO DE EMPRESAS, TEORIA DOS JOGOS
A citação é gerada automaticamente e pode não estar totalmente de acordo com as normas
ABNT
GOMES, Armando e MALDONADO, Wilfredo. Mergers and acquisitions with conditional and unconditional offers. International Journal of Game Theory, v. 49, n. 3, p. 773-800, 2020Tradução . . Disponível em: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00720-6. Acesso em: 20 out. 2025.
APA
Gomes, A., & Maldonado, W. (2020). Mergers and acquisitions with conditional and unconditional offers. International Journal of Game Theory, 49( 3), 773-800. doi:10.1007/s00182-020-00720-6
NLM
Gomes A, Maldonado W. Mergers and acquisitions with conditional and unconditional offers [Internet]. International Journal of Game Theory. 2020 ; 49( 3): 773-800.[citado 2025 out. 20 ] Available from: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00720-6
Vancouver
Gomes A, Maldonado W. Mergers and acquisitions with conditional and unconditional offers [Internet]. International Journal of Game Theory. 2020 ; 49( 3): 773-800.[citado 2025 out. 20 ] Available from: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00720-6
Artigo de periodico
On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many to may buyer seller markets (2017)
Pérez-Castrillo, J. David; Sotomayor, Marilda Antonia de Oliveira
Source: International Journal of Game Theory. Unidade: FEA
Subjects: EQUILÍBRIO ECONÔMICO, COMPETIÇÃO ECONÔMICA
A citação é gerada automaticamente e pode não estar totalmente de acordo com as normas
ABNT
PÉREZ-CASTRILLO, J. David e SOTOMAYOR, Marilda Antonia de Oliveira. On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many to may buyer seller markets. International Journal of Game Theory, v. no 2017, n. 4, p. 1137-1161, 2017Tradução . . Disponível em: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0573-y. Acesso em: 20 out. 2025.
APA
Pérez-Castrillo, J. D., & Sotomayor, M. A. de O. (2017). On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many to may buyer seller markets. International Journal of Game Theory, no 2017( 4), 1137-1161. doi:10.1007/s00182-017-0573-y
NLM
Pérez-Castrillo JD, Sotomayor MA de O. On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many to may buyer seller markets [Internet]. International Journal of Game Theory. 2017 ; no 2017( 4): 1137-1161.[citado 2025 out. 20 ] Available from: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0573-y
Vancouver
Pérez-Castrillo JD, Sotomayor MA de O. On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many to may buyer seller markets [Internet]. International Journal of Game Theory. 2017 ; no 2017( 4): 1137-1161.[citado 2025 out. 20 ] Available from: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0573-y
Artigo de periodico
Modeling cooperative decision situations: the deviation function form and the equilibrium concept (2016)
Sotomayor, Marilda Antonia de Oliveira
Source: International Journal of Game Theory. Unidade: FEA
Subjects: ESTABILIZAÇÃO ECONÔMICA, EQUILÍBRIO ECONÔMICO, TEORIA DOS JOGOS
A citação é gerada automaticamente e pode não estar totalmente de acordo com as normas
ABNT
SOTOMAYOR, Marilda Antonia de Oliveira. Modeling cooperative decision situations: the deviation function form and the equilibrium concept. International Journal of Game Theory, v. 45, n. 3, p. 743-768, 2016Tradução . . Disponível em: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0486-6. Acesso em: 20 out. 2025.
APA
Sotomayor, M. A. de O. (2016). Modeling cooperative decision situations: the deviation function form and the equilibrium concept. International Journal of Game Theory, 45( 3), 743-768. doi:10.1007/s00182-015-0486-6
NLM
Sotomayor MA de O. Modeling cooperative decision situations: the deviation function form and the equilibrium concept [Internet]. International Journal of Game Theory. 2016 ; 45( 3): 743-768.[citado 2025 out. 20 ] Available from: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0486-6
Vancouver
Sotomayor MA de O. Modeling cooperative decision situations: the deviation function form and the equilibrium concept [Internet]. International Journal of Game Theory. 2016 ; 45( 3): 743-768.[citado 2025 out. 20 ] Available from: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0486-6
Artigo de periodico
A further note on the college admission game (2012)
Sotomayor, Marilda Antonia de Oliveira
Source: International Journal of Game Theory. Unidade: FEA
Subjects: ESTABILIDADE, EQUILÍBRIO ECONÔMICO, TEORIA DOS JOGOS
A citação é gerada automaticamente e pode não estar totalmente de acordo com as normas
ABNT
SOTOMAYOR, Marilda Antonia de Oliveira. A further note on the college admission game. International Journal of Game Theory, v. 41, n. 1, p. 179-193, 2012Tradução . . Disponível em: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0278-6. Acesso em: 20 out. 2025.
APA
Sotomayor, M. A. de O. (2012). A further note on the college admission game. International Journal of Game Theory, 41( 1), 179-193. doi:10.1007/s00182-011-0278-6
NLM
Sotomayor MA de O. A further note on the college admission game [Internet]. International Journal of Game Theory. 2012 ; 41( 1): 179-193.[citado 2025 out. 20 ] Available from: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0278-6
Vancouver
Sotomayor MA de O. A further note on the college admission game [Internet]. International Journal of Game Theory. 2012 ; 41( 1): 179-193.[citado 2025 out. 20 ] Available from: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0278-6
Artigo de periodico
The pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences (2011)
Sotomayor, Marilda Antonia de Oliveira
Source: International Journal of Game Theory. Unidade: FEA
Subjects: ESTABILIDADE, TEORIA DOS JOGOS
A citação é gerada automaticamente e pode não estar totalmente de acordo com as normas
ABNT
SOTOMAYOR, Marilda Antonia de Oliveira. The pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences. International Journal of Game Theory, v. 40, n. 3, p. 631-644, 2011Tradução . . Disponível em: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0259-1. Acesso em: 20 out. 2025.
APA
Sotomayor, M. A. de O. (2011). The pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences. International Journal of Game Theory, 40( 3), 631-644. doi:10.1007/s00182-010-0259-1
NLM
Sotomayor MA de O. The pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences [Internet]. International Journal of Game Theory. 2011 ; 40( 3): 631-644.[citado 2025 out. 20 ] Available from: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0259-1
Vancouver
Sotomayor MA de O. The pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences [Internet]. International Journal of Game Theory. 2011 ; 40( 3): 631-644.[citado 2025 out. 20 ] Available from: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0259-1

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