The anti-incumbent effects of conditional cash transfer programs (2018)
Source: Latin American Politics and Society. Unidade: ESALQ
Subjects: DISTRIBUIÇÃO DE RENDA, ELEIÇÃO PRESIDENCIAL, POLÍTICAS PÚBLICAS, REELEIÇÃO, TRANSFERÊNCIA DE RECURSOS, VOTO
ABNT
CORRÊA, Diego Sanches e CHEIBUB, José Antonio. The anti-incumbent effects of conditional cash transfer programs. Latin American Politics and Society, v. 58, n. 1, p. 49-71, 2018Tradução . . Disponível em: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2016.00296.x. Acesso em: 14 out. 2024.APA
Corrêa, D. S., & Cheibub, J. A. (2018). The anti-incumbent effects of conditional cash transfer programs. Latin American Politics and Society, 58( 1), 49-71. doi:10.1111/j.1548-2456.2016.00296.xNLM
Corrêa DS, Cheibub JA. The anti-incumbent effects of conditional cash transfer programs [Internet]. Latin American Politics and Society. 2018 ; 58( 1): 49-71.[citado 2024 out. 14 ] Available from: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2016.00296.xVancouver
Corrêa DS, Cheibub JA. The anti-incumbent effects of conditional cash transfer programs [Internet]. Latin American Politics and Society. 2018 ; 58( 1): 49-71.[citado 2024 out. 14 ] Available from: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2016.00296.x