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On the relationship between political alignment and government transfers: triple differences evidence from a developing country (2020)

  • Authors:
  • USP affiliated authors: SAKURAI, SÉRGIO NARUHIKO - FEARP ; HABENSCHUS, MARIA ISABEL ACCORONI THEODORO - FEARP
  • Unidade: FEARP
  • DOI: 10.1007/s00181-018-1568-7
  • Subjects: POLÍTICA; MUNICÍPIO; GOVERNO ESTADUAL; GOVERNO FEDERAL; FINANÇAS PÚBLICAS
  • Keywords: Political alignment; Fiscal transfers; Brazilian municipalities; Triple differences
  • Agências de fomento:
  • Language: Inglês
  • Imprenta:
  • Source:
  • Acesso à fonteDOI
    Informações sobre o DOI: 10.1007/s00181-018-1568-7 (Fonte: oaDOI API)
    • Este periódico é de assinatura
    • Este artigo NÃO é de acesso aberto
    • Cor do Acesso Aberto: closed

    How to cite
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    • ABNT

      SAKURAI, Sergio Naruhiko; THEODORO, Maria Isabel Accoroni. On the relationship between political alignment and government transfers: triple differences evidence from a developing country. Empirical Economics, Vienna, v. 58, n. 3, p. 1107-1141, 2020. Disponível em: < https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-018-1568-7 > DOI: 10.1007/s00181-018-1568-7.
    • APA

      Sakurai, S. N., & Theodoro, M. I. A. (2020). On the relationship between political alignment and government transfers: triple differences evidence from a developing country. Empirical Economics, 58( 3), 1107-1141. doi:10.1007/s00181-018-1568-7
    • NLM

      Sakurai SN, Theodoro MIA. On the relationship between political alignment and government transfers: triple differences evidence from a developing country [Internet]. Empirical Economics. 2020 ; 58( 3): 1107-1141.Available from: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-018-1568-7
    • Vancouver

      Sakurai SN, Theodoro MIA. On the relationship between political alignment and government transfers: triple differences evidence from a developing country [Internet]. Empirical Economics. 2020 ; 58( 3): 1107-1141.Available from: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-018-1568-7

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