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Between Control and More-than-Human Events: The Listening Experience in the Light of Speculative Pragmatism

Abstract: This paper presents an investigation into the relationship between listening and power in the context of information warfare through the theoretical framework of speculative pragmatism. The main objective is to investigate the possibility of thinking of the listening activity as a particular act of thought through the concepts of lived abstraction and subjectless individuation. For doing this, the first part of the article describes the relationship of reciprocal presupposition between current online information warfare and the production of a subjectivity tied to a narcissistic regime of subjection. The second part of this article describes the concept of lived abstraction, such as elaborated by philosopher Brian Massumi. The third part of this article consists of investigating the epistemological core of speculative pragmatism through Deleuze and Guattari's concept of *subjectless individuation*, particularly the individuation of an event. In the last part, we speculate a possible understanding of listening as an act of thought that is potentially articulated outside the noological register of narcissism through the appreciation of a mode of artistic operation that work in a way of designing listening experiences.

Keywords: listening; individuation; becoming; event; information warfare.

Introduction

This article presents an understanding of the listening activity as being a particular act of thought along with two specific concepts that operate within the scope of speculative pragmatism: *lived abstraction*¹ and *subjectless individuation*.² Through these two concepts we might understand listening as a modality of thought that

¹ Brian Massumi, *What Animals Teach Us about Politics* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2014).

² Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Mille Plateaux: Capitalisme et Schizophrénie 2* (Paris: Les Éditions du Minuit, 1980).

emerges from embodied experience in the context of particular relational situations. Having the concept of *event* as a key-concept, we aim to collaborate to the speculation of the listening activity as being an act of thought that “is nothing if not performed, nothing if not lived out.”³

The following text intends to answer a particular question: to what extent do the concepts of *lived abstraction* and *subjectless individuation* make possible a non-narcissistic comprehension of listening? The main aim of this text is to consider the possibility of an epistemological shift in the theoretical understanding of listening as a particular act of thought, in which the body, the lived situation, and the mode of individuation play a decisive role. To appreciate this epistemological shift, it will be necessary to look at the field of artistic thought and inquire in which ways it articulates listening practices.

By looking at art as a field of thought production, we inquire: which artistic proposals operate in a way of shifting the listening practice from a narcissistic register to a place of lived experience? Which practices activate the experience of listening as a particular mode of embodied act of thought? To situate our speculative approach we must, therefore, characterize the subjection scheme that is massively produced and reproduced in the context of control societies.

In their book *What is Philosophy?*, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari understand the philosophical concept as an operator of thought that only acquires meaning in the tensive relationship it establishes with a problematic context.⁴ Guided by this understanding of what a concept is, our approach to listening is formulated here in contrast to a problematic case concerning the relationship between subjectivity and power amid the current context of information warfare. The material basis of this warfare consists in both ubiquitous computing and the internet, which sets a timely media environment for the spreading of information as cultural viruses – or *memes* – as the discursive paradigm of political propaganda. We emphasize here that this information war puts into play a *regime of subjection* that produces subjectivity through the identification of individuals with representations of themselves as politicized avatars. We analyze this problem through the criticism that sociologist Maurizio Lazzarato makes of mass media as fundamental pieces for managing political power in the context of control societies.⁵

Aware of the fact that listening is not an exclusively human activity, this article deals specifically with the conditions that regulate the activity of listening in human beings. This is due to the fact that our main philosophical problem here regarding the listening activity revolves around relationships of power in the context of control societies. In these kind of societies, the paradigmatic regime of subjection is based on

³ Massumi, *What Animals Teach Us about Politics*, 9.

⁴ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 15–34.

⁵ Maurizio Lazzarato, *Signs and Machines: Capitalism and the Production of Subjectivity* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014).

a mental economy in which the relationship between the self and the other is structured in a way that the other is always an imaginary projection of the self. As such this “other” does not have the agency of an effective otherness, once it is an imaginary projection. After characterizing this regime of subjection, we describe the concepts of *lived abstraction* and *subjectless individuation* as theoretical tools to appreciate means of *deteritorialization*⁶ of listening practices in relation to the control of the listening experience through the management of the public sphere as a meme war.

The information war as an apparatus of social subjection

The literature on listening produced since the beginning of the 21st Century presents a common statement that every act of listening is necessarily associated with specific material and psychological conditions, which makes every human listening practice an activity that can be historically situated.⁷ In this sense, for instance, the phonographic media theorist Jonathan Sterne argues that discourses neglecting the agency of sociocultural particularities over listening practices perform a “false transcendence.”⁸ With this assumption in mind, we inquire about the effects that the context of online information warfare exerts over listening practices. As we shall see, its main effect is the consolidation of a *regime of listening*⁹ whose relational structure is homologous to the structure of Narcissism.

As we have seen since the middle of the 2010s in different countries across the world, the discourse of political propaganda began to employ a strategy that consists in the administration of the figure of an *archenemy* as a means to establish a systematic polarization in the public sphere. This polarization is managed through a series of techniques of misinformation that disseminate conspiracy theories, negationism, historical revisionism, and fake news directed to specific audiences through a digital marketing rationality. This new regime of political propaganda has been working in various countries, in which social relationships are configured as clashes between identities configured as politicized avatars. This type of subjectivity identified as an avatar is the condition of possibility for the emergence of politicians that rise in popularity in a social scenario in which the relational paradigm of the social ties is the war – a *softwar* – not the democratic rule of law.¹⁰

The systematic production and management of a highly polarized public sphere configured as a battleground forms the environment in which subjects assume specific accusatory and defensive roles inside a pre-established and administered relational

⁶ Deleuze and Guattari, *Mille Plateaux: Capitalisme et Schizophrénie* 2, 634–6.

⁷ Peter Szendy, *Écoute: une Histoire de nos Oreilles* (Paris: Minuit, 2001); Jonathan Sterne, *The Audible Past: Cultural Origins of Sound Reproduction* (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2003).

⁸ Sterne, *The Audible Past: Cultural Origins of Sound Reproduction*, 19.

⁹ Peter Szendy, *Écoute: une Histoire de nos Oreilles*.

¹⁰ Michael Walzer, “Introduction,” in *Soft War: The Ethics of Unarmed Conflict*, ed. Michael L. Gross and Tamar Meisels (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

structure. The consolidation of a highly *controlled* social structure entails a problem regarding the relationship between subjectivity and power, once the main product of all control societies is a particular type of subjectivity. As Deleuze stated in the beginning of the 1990s, a “control society” is characterized not by a repressive conduct in relation to individual behaviors, but by the continuous *modulation*¹¹ of both individual and collective desire through a rationality that perceives individuals and masses as “samples, data, markets, or ‘banks’”¹² In this relational paradigm of the exercise of power, the individual is continuously measured and administered through an operationalization of the social life informational environment from which the subjectivity draws its “universes of reference” and “universes of value.”¹³

Drawing from this perspective, the sociologist Maurizio Lazzarato analyses the role that mass media play in the capitalist production of subjectivity. Lazzarato describes mass media as a subjection machine that mobilizes heterogeneous signs as means to capitalize codes, affects and fundamental psychical structures of subjectivity. In this way, mass media articulates the conscious and unconscious spheres of subjectivity in a regime of control that works in the conjunction between “social subjection and machinic enslavement”.¹⁴ Between social subjection of identity and machinic enslavement of desire, Lazzarato concludes that, besides producing goods and services, 20th Century capitalism *produces subjectivity*. Such production, in turn, is accomplished through a *management of the experience of language* mediated by mass media.

In his critical analysis, Lazzarato states that the exercise of power over language operates no longer over a stagnant language, but over a language in state of flux. In this paradigm, instead of censoring speech, the ideal is to *induce speech*. Through the injunction to speak, media perform the function of pieces of an agencying of subjection that produces subjectivity as the main item of the exercise of power in control societies. Without a type of subjectivity always ready to speak, post and reply to posts in social media, there is no effective socially-distributed information war. Here it is necessary to emphasize that, by producing a type of subjectivity, control societies also produce a *regime of listening*.¹⁵ The psychic economy of a subjectivity reduced to its self-image as an identified subject is related to a regime of listening in which the experience of otherness is *systematically nullified*. This regime of listening is homologous to the psychic structure of narcissism, in which the relationship between self and other is not a relationship of real otherness, but always imaginary, resulting from projections of the self over the exterior reality. There is no otherness in the realm of meme war.

¹¹ Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations, 1972–1990*, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 178–80.

¹² Ibid., 180.

¹³ Félix Guattari, *Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm*, trans. by Paul Bain and Julian Pefanis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 33–57.

¹⁴ Lazzarato, *Signs and Machines: Capitalism and the Production of Subjectivity*, 23–29.

¹⁵ Szendy, *Écoute: une Histoire de nos Oreilles*.

At this point, it is worth remarking on a specific part of the myth of Narcissus which is frequently untold in psychoanalytic elaborations: in his passionate identification with his own image, Narcissus *becomes deaf*. The relational economy of narcissism as a psychic structure produces at the same time *identification* and *deafness*. Considering this problem, we inquire for the conditions of possibility of a listening experience articulated outside the scope of control as a paradigm of power. We are particularly interested in two of speculative pragmatism's concepts that allow us to think of these conditions of possibility.

Lived abstraction as an act of thought

In the book *What Animals Teach Us About Politics* (2014), Brian Massumi analyses a situation of play between two wolf cubs, in which biting gestures are experienced not as combat gestures, but as play. Massumi argues that the fact that a gesture usually associated with the field of combat is interpreted by the bitten animal as a gesture belonging to the field of play corresponds to the opening of an “analogical gap”¹⁶ in which the animal implies in its gesture a degree of abstraction. According to the philosopher, from combat to play, the playful gesture transposes the lived situation to a *different existential arena* as the combat situation is repeated as a simulacrum and experienced as play.¹⁷ Massumi argues that this level of abstraction placed upon the situation of combat configures a single act loaded with a logical complexity that paradoxically holds the situation of combat and play together. This paradoxical conjunction is characterized by a logical possibility of understanding relational situations in which the two terms of the relationship “are performatively fused without becoming confused.”¹⁸ This logic, in turn, corresponds to that which Gilles Deleuze called a “disjunctive synthesis,”¹⁹ which dedicates itself to thinking of assemblages in which the assembled elements are brought together while maintaining their difference, coming together without melding together, co-occurring without coalescing. Explicitly referencing the Deleuzian concept of “disjunctive synthesis”, Massumi insists in the “paradoxical nature of abstraction effected in the animal play,”²⁰ describing it as an instance of the Epimenides paradox, which consists of a negative statement containing an implied negative metastatement.²¹ Analyzing this particular paradox, the philo-

¹⁶ Massumi, *What Animals Teach Us about Politics*, 5.

¹⁷ “The currently occurring action finds itself inhabited by actions belonging to a different existential arena, whose actions are effectively felt to be present, but in potential, held in suspense.” (Massumi, *What Animals Teach Us about Politics*, 6). In a more synthetic formulation, the philosopher states that “My gesture transports you with me into a different arena of activity than the one we were just in.” (Massumi, *What Animals Teach Us about Politics*, 5).

¹⁸ Massumi, *What Animals Teach Us about Politics*, 34.

¹⁹ Gilles Deleuze, *Différence et Répétition* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968).

²⁰ Massumi, *What Animals Teach Us about Politics*, 6.

²¹ In order to support this thesis, Massumi argues that “the gestural statement ‘this is not a bite’ contains the implicit metastatement ‘these actions do not denote what they would denote’. But at the same time, if it was so

opher concludes that “the ludic gesture embodies this complexity. Its abstraction is embodied thought.”²²

Considering the ludic gesture of animal play as a form of embodied thinking, Massumi understands that the paradox implied in the playful gesture as being *an event in which abstraction assumes efficacy*. In this particular situation, abstraction is leveled with performance, being directly implied in the immediacy of its gesture’s execution. In this context of opening a “gap” of abstraction in the animal gesture, the philosopher introduces one more degree of abstraction, which corresponds to the capacity to improvise. The playful gesture opens the animal’s horizon of possibilities as a field in which s/he can improvise, that is, a concrete situation in which the animal *responds to the situation* in order to find intelligent solutions. Massumi calls this process “intensification”, which refers to a situation in which “each act carries a double charge of reality [...] each ludic gesture is loaded with these differences of level, situation and mode of active existence.”²³ This overlapping of a degree of abstraction that duplicates a combative animal gesture in a gesture of a different nature is understood by the philosopher as being an exemplary case of a passage to a type of abstraction which couldn’t be written down or formulated in some kind of code. Of course, the wolf cubs could not do that, and yet, their act bears abstraction. It is *a type of abstraction whose material media is the performance of the body in a lived experience*. The philosopher concludes: “the form of abstraction staged in play is a *lived abstraction*.”²⁴

Through the concept of *lived abstraction*, Massumi’s speculative maneuver consists in taking a non-human relational situation as being the dynamic model for the elaboration of a human artifact (the philosophical concept). The horizon of human thought becomes permeated by modalities of non-human intelligence. This is a concrete example of the speculative gesture which Isabelle Stengers and Didier Debaise speak of while characterizing speculative pragmatism as a type of philosophical thought capable of thinking “modes of existence in their own setting, in their mode of success, in their immanent demands.”²⁵

simple a case as the actions not denoting what they would denote, they would not have to deny their denoting. The play statement is one that says what it denies, and denies what it says. It is logically undecidable. Of course, a wolf cub doesn’t say anything, strictly speaking. It says in doing. It acts. Its ‘statement’ and ‘metastatement’ are an enacted paradox, one with the simplicity of a single gesture. In the unicity of the gesture, two logics are gathered together in one metacommunication, charging the situation with possibilities that surpass it.” (Massumi, *What Animals Teach Us about Politics*, 7).

²² Massumi, *What Animals Teach Us about Politics*, 7.

²³ Ibid., 9.

²⁴ Idem.

²⁵ Isabelle Stengers and Didier Debaise, “The Insistence of Possibles: Towards a Speculative Pragmatism,” trans. Angela Brewer, *Parse Journal* 7 (2017): 15.

The primacy of *lines* and subjectless individuation

The concept of lived abstraction removes the concept of thought from the restricted sphere of the self, placing it in the sphere of the body and the lived situation. More than that, this concept performs a pivotal epistemological operation, relocating the concept of thought from the human sphere to an extra-human sphere. This theoretical operation performed by Brian Massumi unfolds the discussion made by Deleuze on the *processes of individuation*.²⁶ Through this debate, Deleuze shifts the emphasis from the individual to the process of individuation, and understands the subject as being the result that emerges from a relational process composed by heterogeneous agents.²⁷ According to this perspective, the category of subject is equally agent and patient, active and passive, subject and object.

The philosophical starting point taken by Deleuze is the conceptualization of a relational “plane of consistency” prior to the sphere of the subject, which configures itself as a kind of “prebiotic soup”²⁸ whose basic agents aren’t formed entities, but tendential movements endowed with “speeds and affects”²⁹ This *pre-individual plane of consistency* is the epistemological starting point assumed by Deleuze as necessary to think about two leading concepts in his philosophy: the concepts of *agencement* and *event*. From this starting point, his task was to formulate concepts that are capable of logically mapping the mode of existence of these pre-individual agents. In this context, the concept of *event* is understood as a relational composition between heterogeneous pre-individual agents.³⁰ Therefore, an event in itself is formed as a process of individuation.

²⁶ “Individuation” is the key concept of the process-oriented ontology developed by the philosopher Gilbert Simondon. This theory understands every form as an emergence from a process of pre-formal interactions between differences of potential. Therefore, this theory postulates the concept of “individual” as being always the partial result of a process of individuation. Its formal stability is always “meta-stable”. According to this theory, there is no form in itself: every form is the partial result of a concrete agency of specific materials and forces. Therefore, for Simondon, the concept of individual needs to be referred to the process of genesis through which the individual is constituted. Regarding this theme, see: Gilbert Simondon, “The Genesis of the Individual”, trans. Mark Cohen and Sanford Kwinter, in *Incorporations*, ed. Jonathan Crary and Sanford Kwinter (New York: Zone Books, 1992), 297–319.

²⁷ After *Différence and Répétition* (1968), in the works written along with Félix Guattari, this relational process composed by heterogeneous agents is called *agencement*, a term that was first translated into English as “assemblages”, which has generated controversy. Some commentators prefer to keep the original term – *agencement* – due to its similarity to the term *agency*, a fundamental notion of this concept.

²⁸ Deleuze and Guattari, *Mille Plateaux: Capitalisme et Schizophrénie* 2, 66.

²⁹ “Even when times are abstractly equal, the individuation of a life is not the same as the individuation of the subject that leads it or serves as its support. It is not the same plane: in the first case, it is the plane of consistency or of composition of haecceities, which knows only speeds and affects; and in the second case, it is the altogether different plane of forms, substances, and subjects.” (Deleuze and Guattari, *Mille Plateaux: Capitalisme et Schizophrénie* 2, 319–20).

³⁰ In the introduction to *Différence and Répétition*, Deleuze describes his epistemological starting point as follows: “We believe in a world in which individuations are impersonal and singularities are pre-individual.” (Deleuze, *Différence et Répétition*, 4).

The concept of individuation intervenes epistemologically with a modal and relational perspective, granting an ontological primacy to the relationship. Different modes of existence – including that of the human being – arise from a more-than-human relational dimension. It is in this sense that Deleuze and Guattari affirms that “before Being, there is politics,”³¹ once the primacy of relationship is thought, therefore, in the level of a fundamental dimension composed by germinal movements in an impersonal and pre-individual sphere. In the pre-individual sphere, the most basic components are *tendential movements*, which Deleuze and Guattari call *lines*. In the logical system of the book *A Thousand Plateaus*, the concept of *line* works as a vital conceptual operator: “there are no points or positions in a rhizome, such as those found in a structure, tree, or root. *There are only lines.*”³² This logical system further elaborates the discussion over processes of individuation as a logic of *agencements*.

The concept of *line* is a key operator for understanding Deleuze and Guattari’s speculative pragmatism, for it allows a comprehension of a particular kind of *subjectless individuation*, that is, the individuation of an *event*. In the logical system of *A Thousand Plateaus*, “lines” are individuation vectors gifted with a capacity of agency. Its basic coordinates are a material expression and a degree of speed. In logical terms, an event is a collective agency made of lines, and every *agencement* is a composition made up of “intersecting lines”³³ The concept of *line* refers to the agents that compose the immanence of an event. Therefore, to think of an event is to think of the lines that compose it, that is, mapping the tendential movements that acquire consistency in the composition of an event. Through this logic, the supposition according to which “individuations are impersonal”³⁴ acquires particular developments in the concept of *subjectless individuation*.³⁵ Among the different types of subjectless individuation, there is a particular kind of individuation that refers to the individuation of the event, which Deleuze and Guattari refer to through the term *haecceity*.³⁶ The “individuation by haecceity”³⁷ is precisely a type of individuation of the event, and requires a logical system capable of thinking a relational dimension between vector movements.³⁸ In this context, the individuated entity is not even a human being, but a more-than-human entity, an *event*.

³¹ Deleuze and Guattari, *Mille Plateaux: Capitalisme et Schizophrénie* 2, 249.

³² Ibid., 15.

³³ Ibid., 263.

³⁴ Deleuze, *Différence et Répétition*, 4.

³⁵ Deleuze and Guattari, *Mille Plateaux: Capitalisme et Schizophrénie* 2, 326.

³⁶ “There is a mode of individuation very different from that of a person, subject, thing, or substance. We reserve the name *haecceity* for it. A season, a winter, a summer, an hour, a date have a perfect individuality lacking nothing, even though this individuality is different from that of a thing or a subject. They are *haecceities* in the sense that they consist entirely of relations of movement and rest between molecules or particles, capacities to affect and be affected.” (Ibid., 318).

³⁷ Deleuze and Guattari, *Mille Plateaux: Capitalisme et Schizophrénie* 2, 319, 329, 633.

³⁸ “The plane of consistency contains only *haecceities* along intersecting lines. Forms and subjects are not of that world.” (Deleuze and Guattari, *Mille Plateaux: Capitalisme et Schizophrénie* 2, 263).

In order to elaborate the concept of event in terms of subjectless individuation, Deleuze and Guattari approach multiple literary, performative, filmic, and musical artworks. Artistic works are referred to as particular cases of a non-substantial thought that puts into practice different types of *haecceities*. These works are referred to as paradigmatic cases of a strictly relational speculative thought, in which “each individual is composed of infinite, extensive parts that belong to it within one particular relationship.”³⁹

Therefore, with the concepts of *lived abstraction* and *subjectless individuation* we have two operators for an epistemological rupture with the philosophies of conscience, considering that both concepts situate the *mode of existence* of notions such as thought and individual in a more-than-human sphere. Therefore, both concepts of *thought* and *event* do not necessarily have the form of a human. What about listening?

Listening as intersecting lines

No other century has theoretically inquired listening practices as much as the 20th Century. In this respect, we must highlight the field of artistic thought, since it gathered several different initiatives that speculated and formulated experiences of listening as being *a particular act of thought*. In order to appreciate speculative initiatives on the listening activity formulated in the field of art, we might highlight the particular field of the multimedia artistic practices often referred to as the “sound arts” or the “sonic arts”.

The umbrella term “sound art” is employed in different parts of the world as a name for heterogeneous experimentations on sound, but also a vast range of experimentations on listening practices as being *the created thing*. In this sense, the very listening embodied experience is the artistic *composite*.⁴⁰ Being an artistic composite, the very situation of listening is an incomplete kind of composite which, in order to become complete, demands a body that concretely experiences a lived situation.

In this regard, we highlight works in the intersection between sound art and performance, which instead of describing what “individuations by haecceities” are, they rather invite listeners to experience this kind of individuation through listening practices. Consider, for example, those works inviting you to “actively imagining sounds; listen to present sounds; remembering sounds.”⁴¹ For example: “take a walk at night. Walk so silently that the bottoms of your feet become ears.”⁴² These artistic propositions are less about the production of particular sounds than the very experience of both physical and psychic individuation through listening. In other words, these propositions are about listening as an act of thought that “is nothing if not performed, nothing if not lived out.”⁴³

³⁹ Anne Sauvagnargues, *Deleuze and Art*, trans. Samantha Bankston (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 42.

⁴⁰ Here we follow Deleuze and Guattari in their statement about the object of art as being the *composite sensation*: “Art wants to create the finite that restores the infinite: it lays out a plane of composition that, in turn, through the action of aesthetic figures, bears monuments or composite sensations.” (Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 197).

⁴¹ Pauline Oliveros, *Sonic Meditations* (South Strafford: Smith Publications, 1971), 2.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 9.

⁴³ Massumi, *What Animals Teach Us about Politics*, 9.

Conclusion

In control societies, experience and attention are transformed into economic assets.⁴⁴ Experience and attention are literally worth money, and, inside this logic, listening practices and the very listening time are codified and traded for financial capital. It is legitimate to think that the cultural industries that operate in the creative economy forge listening habits according to its commercial necessities. As we have seen above, not only cultural industries build *regimes of listening*, but also do political propaganda. As we saw above, the context of online information warfare made evident the fact that propaganda is currently practiced as a particular kind of entertainment,⁴⁵ as political theses circulate in the form of memes featuring the figure of an archenemy. In such a context, the activity of listening is circumscribed within the limits of a relational economy that mystifies the image of the other, while maintaining the act of listening exclusively available for content with messages that make sense within the information war.

As a contrast to this regime of subjection, we saw two particular concepts operating within the scope of speculative pragmatism, both enacting processes of individuation articulated in a more-than-human relational sphere. Through this speculative plane of immanence, we may think of possibilities of listening articulated outside the abovementioned regime of listening. In this respect, we consider some artistic propositions acting in a way of designing listening experiences, which are anchored in the local and micropolitical dimension of embodied experience. Our appreciation of art has not to do with an idealization of art as a field of saving human beings through sensitivity, but with the fact that art is a particular field of thought production. With regard to the listening activity, the field of sound art frequently operates as a “philosophical laboratory”⁴⁶ that proposes actions in which it “effects a passage to a pragmatics where a different logic is directly embodied in action, flush with gesture.”⁴⁷ In other words, there are particular works of art that enact contingent *planes of immanence*⁴⁸ in particular listening experiences. These contingent planes of immanence are contiguous to the speculative pragmatism proposition to appreciate acts of thought as embodied experiences that are lived up in relational spheres exceeding the subject identified with its anthropocentric image.

⁴⁴ Matthew Crawford, *The World Beyond Your Head: On Becoming an Individual in an Age of Distraction* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015).

⁴⁵ Derek Thompson, *Hitmakers: The Science of Popularity in the Age of Distraction* (New York: Penguin, 2017), 28.

⁴⁶ Massumi, *What Animals Teach Us about Politics*, 47–8.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁴⁸ Cf. Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*

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