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UDC 78.01

Original scientific paper

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## **Affects of Chaos: Rhetorical Pathos and the Epistemology of Musical Discourse**

**Abstract:** This paper proposes a systematic reflection on how performances embody not only propositional statements but also projections of affective worlds, trying to avoid objectification of people and feelings in favor of a movable and fluid sense of meaning. This reflection is mostly orientated to the reality of musical discourse, especially contemporary, where lack of consensus seems to abound, but it goes through all the arts that, somehow, consider the same ongoing situation in the action of performance. It starts discussing the concept of *pathos* in Philosophy, trying to trace its development in history, reaching its Latin form as *affectus*. Both terms address discussions on what is know the meaning of an artistic discourse and how is possible to know that, having support in concepts such as *fittingness*, *empathy* and *Stimmung*, referenced by the thought of philosophers like Gilles Deleuze, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Martin Heidegger and by the ancient and retrieved art of Rhetoric.

**Keywords:** Contemporary Music, Musical Rhetoric, Musical Performance, Epistemology, Musical Gesture

„In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. In Time, Space and Matter were created. However, the earth was without form and void.“ „An empty chaos of heaven and earth was created“ (Calvin, Commentary to Genesis 1: 1); the matter had no form. In the beginning was chaos. From chaos the world emerges: „Chaos is defined not so much by its disorder as by the infinite speed of birth and disappearance“ (Deleuze; Guattari, 1991: 128). In chaos there is no time for reflection or for ascetic contemplation. Chaos is the expanding cosmos; it is the territory of sensation.

The world is not created out of order, but out of crisis and so are performing arts in general. Creative processes come and go, and performers keep going up the stage and placing themselves in the irreversible *kairós* of delivering a discourse with their words, gestures, and beings. But as chaotic as it is the extended sense of present in performance, it is also the void and formless gap between performer and public, or even more, between performer and author. Communicative gaps are everywhere, generating conflicts and misunderstandings. In the dark times like ours of rampage and hateful relationships, is a pacific and covenantal solution possible instead of turning the stage into a battlefield where authors die and performers get hurt?

Maybe a major part of the issue is due to the expectation of understanding we have of others; even more, the expectation they understand and feel like ourselves, which is constantly dismissed and frustrated as human relationships usually are. Following those steps, it seems wiser to review the path that led us to such a raging situation and step back to the common territory of sensation, where all humans share their most basic and primal sense of being-in-the-world.

### *Passion and connection*

From taking music as sort of discourse follows a harsh challenge: asserting it has a meaning. But supposing there is such a thing as meaning in music, can it be somehow known? What is the limit between the atheism of meaning, its complete negation, and the agnosticism of meaning, the mere presumption of the impossibility of having access to it? In what way can Contemporary Music have its meaning lived, made alive in being made? One could approach these issues metaphysically or ontologically, but this attempt is to face it epistemologically as its conclusions aim to define.

Few would deny the emotional attribute of music; on the contrary, perhaps many would attribute only this property of meaning to it. Music as (sonorous) expression of feelings (Liszt apud. Strunk, 1950: 850), a subjective expression of an even more particular interpretation. However, between the romanticized popular sense and the philosophical present, there seems to be a great gap to be filled with a considerable amount of reflection.

Perhaps one of the great merits of the ancient art of rhetoric in its contact with music is the assumption of the triad *logos*, *pathos*, and *ethos* to the status of cornerstone of the discourse in its unique power. The logical, emotional, and ethical dimensions of discourse, so to speak, constitute the *sine qua non* of human communication or, ultimately, of human relations. If Positivism exacerbated modern rationalism, it is possible to see Cartesian traits latent in all worldviews that somehow dichotomized the relationship between the *logos* and *pathos*, or between reason and emotion, and it is doubtless in the twentieth century that this binomial collapses.

In rhetoric, reason and emotion, *logos* and *pathos*, are not antagonistic but complementary terms, which find in their sum with *ethos* the full realization of discourse. It is evident that the *logos*, which we remember is originally the discourse itself, with all its internal structure, is the only way by which the *pathos* and *ethos* can be instruments of adherence (Aristotle, 1356a), but its absolutization ends up determining an epistemology of purely rational and formal discourse or, to use the concept of Jacques Derrida, logocentric.

Although *pathos* occupies prominence in classical rhetoric, it becomes difficult to define today this dimension of discourse, since a large number of approaches already take this idea. In general, all notions orbit around the idea of movement from the inside out of the being. *Pathos*, it may be said preliminarily, is this expanding energy - chaotic - this deformed movement of a being wanting in some way to reach the other, like the image of an individual who, unable to speak, physically gestures in despair to be understood. But to some extent, we all live in this desperation, in this constant anguish for putting something out of ourselves. This is one of the possible translations of *pathos*: emotion.

Emotion means a movement out, an *ex motus*. It is in this sense that the Romans saw in rhetoric the power to *movere*, to move beings. Somehow, it is a flow of energy that is directed outwards, seeking, sometimes the right word, or sometimes the right sound. Perhaps it is in that same sense that the term 'expression' occurs, like that energy that presses something out, as a necessity that surpasses the will in its impetus. However, the translation of *pathos* as emotion is recent and is due more to the current meaning that this term has in opposition to the reason than its original sense (Fitzgerald, 2008: 3).

The two terms most commonly used in Latin translations of rhetoric were *passio* and *affectus*, passion and affect<sup>1</sup>. The first term has an etymology more directly linked to the Greek antecedent, but that does not mean that the meanings are the same. *Pathos* comes from the root *páskhō* (πάσχω), which means experiencing something, as the Latin term makes clearly, *passively*. For this reason, the term is also very close to the idea of suffering for/from something, a passion, as Christ suffered in his Passion, in this passive connotation of *pathos*. But this is not the only reading of rhetorical *pathos*.

When Aristotle defines *pathos*, in the context of his *Metaphysics*, he concludes, „In one sense, [it is] a quality in virtue of which alteration is possible“ (Aristotle, 1022b). However, in the *Rhetoric*, this definition becomes more accurate in its interpretation; when he presents what would be the passions or *pathe*, the plural of *pathos*, he says that they are „everything that leads man to change his opinion...“ (Aristotle,

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<sup>1</sup> The English language has difficulty to translate the concept, since the same word, affection, is used to refer to the Latin terms *affectus*, *affectionem*, and *affectio*.

1378a), in an approximate translation. Here it is important to spend a few moments to examine this translation problem, one of the most severe of the treatise. Translations usually understand the ‘everything’ as „feelings“, „things“ or even „affections“ (W. Rhys Roberts, H. S. Lawson-Tancred and J. H. Freese, respectively). We point this not as a gross failure, but as a difficulty inherent in the meaning of this anxiety that the concept is, hardly definable and more difficult to translate. This was the perception of Martin Heidegger when he turned to this problem in Aristotle, treating the original ‘everything,’ *metaballontes* (μεταβάλλοντες), as a basic concept for his understanding. Heidegger defines the term as „something along the way with respect to which ‘a change sets in for us’, through which ‘we change’ from one disposition to another“ (Heidegger, 2009: 115). It is not so much a Newtonian idea of one object striking the other and modifying its trajectory, but much more a modulation where circumstance and being conform themselves in a new direction.

For this reason, to equate *pathos* to the passivity of passion ends up reducing the meaning of the concept as a whole. Michel Meyer will continue this reflection, presenting *pathos* as the identity of the subject, not so much in an ontological sense, but in an „ontopathic“ sense, so to speak, where the definition does not require to attend the principle of non-contradiction to exist. Passion is the ambiguous contingency of all that the subject is but does not want to be, or is not but would like to be; Passion is the set of these existential forces that now extrapolate the body, or implode it. It is in this sense that *pathos* presents itself as the epistemological foundation par excellence in rhetoric. It exposes *logos*, as if constraining it, making it known. It is not an immoralism, but rather the magnetism between pain and pleasure, an ethical gradation of fittingness (Meyer, 2000a and 2000b: 45-47).

Meyer sees in the *pathos* as passion the necessity of the human, of the movement towards, which, therefore, does not come from nature, but reaches the natural. „If there is passion there is action“ (Meyer, 2000a: xxxvii). In this way, the passions could be as catalogueable as humans and their actions. It may be possible to choose poles, points of reference, but the contingency of motion results in a passionate fluidity, a boiling point of constant instability, fixable only in reference to something. And it is in this relationship that *pathos* assumes its role of connecting beings, operating distances, imagining the sensation and sensing the image.

It is important the retrieval Meyer does from Cartesian propositions about the passions. Although the *cogito*, the rational thought, is the most prominent aspect of the philosophy of Descartes and it is most valued by the resulting Modern thought, the passionate aspect is still strongly present in his conception of reality and knowledge. Although most remembered for the physiological interpretation of the passions, which strongly influenced the whole Doctrine of the Affects of Baroque Music, Descartes is bold in his anti-Platonic proposition when he says that „each of us has only

one soul, which doesn't have different parts; it is at once sensitive and rational too, and all its appetites are volitions" (Descartes, *Passions of the Soul*, art. 47). Already in the first article of his treatise on the passions, Descartes assumes that if passion is that which is suffered, and action is that which is done, ultimately the difference between the both is no more than perspective. *Sentio ergo sum*. I feel therefore I am.

*The affect and the sensation*

It is understood so far that the difference between *passio* and *affectio* regarding their adequacy to the rhetorical *pathos* seems to be more of emphasis, than of meaning. However, the second term has been, since the latinization of rhetoric by Cicero, the most used as a reference to the pathetic dimension of discourse (Fitzgerald, 2008: 3). *Affectio*, the third declension form of *affectus*, comes from *ad + facio*, or a make in or make towards. Thus, the concept is born from the idea of an action done towards another body. This meaning was especially widespread in German musical rhetoric, where the rhetorical *pathos*, or *Affekt*, originated a systematization from the impetus not only to express this affective movement, but to move the other, making it part of the musical discourse, the *affectus movere* (Bartel, 1997: 32).

The Affect thus arises as one of the great matters of musical thought and its application in contexts purely instrumental or devoid of the verbal text. The affect also presents itself as a central concept in the Modern Philosophy from the postulates of Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) in his *Ethics*. Due to the geometric method proposed in his systematization, Spinoza very clearly defines his understanding of whatever *affectus* is:

By 'affect' I understand states of a body by which its power of acting is increased or lessened, helped or hindered, and also the ideas of these states. Thus, if we can be the adequate cause of any of these states, the affect in question is what I call an 'action'; otherwise it is a 'passion'. (SPINOZA, [1677], p. 51 [Book III, D3])

Although the definition resorts to other equally fundamental and complex concepts within Spinoza's thought, the distinction already established between the active and passive scopes of *pathos* is remarkable. Although later Spinoza goes to punctuate passions that actively act in the modulation between bodies, like love, desire, hate, etc., these are much more topologies than typologies, reference points instead of catalogues of feelings. The idea established in its definition is precisely that of a spectral complex of satisfactions and dissatisfactions from which comes the energy to act or, more broadly, to existence. In the passage from the passive affect to the active affect lies the very liberation of man, the autonomy of his will to be.

This reality needs to be clarified, since it is not from the attribution of an affective fixation - of a feeling - that can come to the knowledge of the propositive content of the musical discourse, as interpretations and musical analyses often do, from the more to the least theorized. It is not so much a matter of knowing an object, but a goal, a directionality, the vector of the energetic flow that approximates and repels the bodies, whether these bodies are notes, acts, or, finally, gestures. „Different men can be affected differently by one object; and one man can be affected differently at different times by one object“ (Spinoza, [1677]: 70 [Book III, Proposition 51]). Thus the search for theoretical exhaustion, for a hermeneutical key that unlocks the ultimate knowledge of what a musical work „does“, at best, results in a provisional knowledge, because although the work has permanence, it does so on a trajectory, because sounds are trajectories, just as textual marks and interpretive traditions are so; such as the interpretation of the one who actualizes the discourse is a trajectory, because in this same movement remains the interpreter.

The affective activity thus emerges as evidence of the *responsibility* and *intention* of an agent in music, of a composer or an interpreter. This is because starting from a parallelism where there is no primacy of the soul or mind in relation to the body, the question of a musical ideal to be achieved, whether in composition or interpretation, is solved (Deleuze, 1988: 90). It is in the interaction between composer and text and subsequently between text and interpreter that the affective responses between bodies emerge and, similarly, between sounds and listeners, whether these interpreters are of the performance or analytical order. This affective cycle redraws the dynamics of musical discourse as an affective field and not as a unidirectional line. Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758), the New England theologian, will define these affective vectors as an *inclination* in the unity of being and not of a possible partition between mind, body, and spirit or any other possibility. The inclination is this bodily complex in motion and, for this reason, toward, in an affection (McDermott, 2012: 178).

The Affect is the possibility of musical knowledge par excellence precisely because it recognizes that in being established it competes with this inclination and movement. Any sense of purely intellectual or purely perceptual knowledge thus becomes a reduced reading, an inadequate knowledge of reality, since human knowledge can only happen when the human knows and when the unity of the human is applied in connecting to the other. It is possible to undertake thicker descriptions of musical discourse only if in some way the whole affective field is part of such description and if the *pathos* can indicate the direction from which the *logos* is actualized. This is how Edwards proposes, in turn, the definition of affection as „the most vigorous and practical exercises of the inclination and will of the soul“ (Edwards, 1746: 6). In a manner similar to Spinoza, Edwards understands affect as an overcoming of passion, as an activity that regards responsibility and thus the freedom of action

of a body in relation to others or, contingent, of a man in relation to his environment (Niebuhr, 2004 [1972]: 44).

It is in the act of affecting that an affect is produced. And thus, the duration of affect corresponds to the duration of the affection itself. No body can remain the same after that moment. The affect, returning to the proposition of Heidegger, is the whole thing: bodies, affection, and the becoming connection. And in this relation of affects, attractions, and repulsions, the lines of a discourse are drawn, the *Sätze*, the parts of the musical whole; the connections between things, the moments experienced in music making, in the vector proper to each musical action involved in the discourse, far beyond the poles joy and sadness or love and hate, in an ethic of constant force that, when disturbing, provokes the revolt of having to 'understand', giving a name to that disturbance. In this questioning of 'why does this happen?' or 'what is happening?' the subject puts himself in a passive position, seeking the cause of all that movement. But in freezing and paralyzing the condition one forgets her or his own force of action in that movement. The individual attributes to an affective object what the subject was doing. One forgets that it was neither in the object nor in the subject, finally, that the movement was, but precisely in the clash between them. And the shock that electrocutes cannot be measured by the voltmeter or on the excited skin (Deleuze, 1988: 130).

When it comes to the idea of epistemology, of the knowledge of things, surely one of the first names that comes to mind is that of Francis Bacon. When Deleuze discusses this theme it is precisely from Francis Bacon that he departs - Not the philosopher of science, but the painter. In a work like Bacon's, what is possible to know of its meaning? If the forms do not produce easily identifiable figures or tell a story, what is the order of meaning of such a work of art? Deleuze lends the term of Cezanne and attributes to *sensation* the order of meaning of this art that surpasses the figurations, the pictorial conventions agreed in the *loci topici* of each art. Not that sensation is a novelty, but simply because it is the skeleton of life itself, a kind of pre-meaning, but better than that, it is meaning itself, which does not depend on referentials to exist. More than a few conservative critiques can shout that this kind of art (whether visual or musical) corrupts or distorts reality, it does deal with another aspect of reality, deals with the composition of sensation. In this case, the painted figure or the musical sequence, before mimicking and representing an object, paint and compose the sensation of its reality.

It is not a matter of expressing a feeling, not even of trying to create an emotional effect on the viewer, because the artistic act is the sensation itself in expansion; it is the energy of the explosion and not only a copy of that; it is much more about sharing elementary sensations, vibrations that cross the body and reach the soul. This precedes love or hate, sadness or joy; precedes the emotional association that

comes from sensation. It is the affect, the *movere* of being, which is in fact movement, or, to paraphrase some terms of the biblical original, is „the *logos* of God living and active, sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing to the division of soul and of spirit, of *harmony* and of marrow“.<sup>2</sup>

This affect starts from the actualization of reality to exist; it is not an intersubjectivity, but rather the very questioning of easily accepting the division between subject and object. The sensation permeates the bodies and it is in this sense that it can be shared. When recalling „The Burial of the Count of Orgaz“, by El Greco, Deleuze notes that although the lower half of the picture narrates a story, the upper half, where the Count is received in the Heavens, no longer attends figuration; bodies and colors are distorted. Not because this reality is not real, but because it is real that one can paint not a representation, but the very sensation of the encounter with Christ, with the divine *logos*. Recalling Dostoevsky, when he says, „if God did not exist, everything would be allowed“, Deleuze reverses the affirmation: because God exists, or because the *logos* is given, so it is possible to do all things, for therein is true liberation from sensation (Deleuze, 2017). Or, as the philosopher Cornelius Van Til states, it is only from the knowledge of God that it is possible „to engage in ‘abstraction,’ because its abstraction need not be false“ (Van Til, 1948: 272). Where there is discourse, *pathos* is free to run and move each one in its own way.

Perhaps it is more in this sense that Beethoven thinks in his Sixth Symphony, when, to the subtitle „Pastoral“, he adds the prefatory verse „more the expression of a sensation than a painting“.<sup>3</sup> Here again, a brief translation note is important. This is because Beethoven uses the term *Empfindung*, which brings a more immediate, sensorial connotation, and not the term *Gefühle*, as Liszt does in the passage above mentioned when he says that music was the „expression of feeling.“ Beethoven is clear in delimiting what his piece was not: it was not the description of a pastoral scene, but a mark of his sensation in living such a scene. It does not deal with the accuracy with which, in the second movement, he transcribes the cuckoo with the clarinet, or the brook with the cellos, but in how he composes his sensation before the cuckoo and the brook. Nor is it merely to put out your sentimental desires and daydreams, but simply an external mark (*Ausdruck*), the redoing of an affective force.

Thus *expression* can be validated as one of the vectors of this affective energy. Not so much as a genius-inspired will or impetus, but as a movement that leaves its impression. Expression and impression are, therefore, directions of energetic vectors that are fixed in the pressures between the bodies. It is in an inadequate perspective on

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2 Letter to the Hebrews, 4: 12 (ESV). The Greek word here translated as harmony is *harmon* (ἁρμονίαν), a term that generally designates the joints of the human body, but all that holds together the parts of a whole.

3 In the original: „Mehr Ausdruck der Empfindung als Malerei.“

pressures that led to criticism the historian Antonin Matějček, when he pejoratively denominates a certain group of painters as „Expressionists“ by reducing in those painted marks a romantic desire to root the becoming (Gordon, 1987: 175). Or maybe the artists themselves collaborate to that perception. The point is that from expression to impression, or in depression itself, all are directions, trajectories of a flow that constantly connect and reconnect bodies. And it is on this trajectory that the access to something beyond ourselves in the other can be glimpsed: the knowledge.

*Towards an adequate knowledge of the meaning in music*

After the assumption of an existential meaning made in music, known from the affections created and recreated in this discourse, the questions „what is the meaning of this piece?“ or „what is the meaning of this passage?“ become inadequate already in their conceptions. Perhaps the most appropriate is to recognize that *if the meaning of music could be achieved in words, the very existence of music would not be necessary*. It is precisely because its meaning does not fit into verbal discourse and because it deals with another aspect of reality that music becomes an intrinsically human action, which, absolutely, is not the same as saying that this meaning cannot be known or shared.

The idea of movements, inclinations, and connections - of affect - produces a directional flow that has its textual fixation, thus demanding an interpretation of the one that actualizes the discourse, that is, a knowledge of which is such flow, so the interpretation is made in action. This concretization of the discourse, in turn, generates a new data to be interpreted by another instance of discourse that no longer knows it through the textual mark – the public, but by the interpretive actions of motion generating sound – the performance. Thus, the twofold temporal nature of music results in an attribute of double interpretation. The difficulty remains: is there any kind of knowledge on the part of the *performer* of that affect whose force produced marks in a text?

It is very important to recall the premises of intention and direction as the basis for this quest for knowledge, for by definition they will be the only reasonable possibilities. The musical text is then placed as an authorial testimony. Again, it is not an autobiographical but the testimony of the energy of an affect. And, as a testimony, this energy is placed not only in the direction of something but also in the direction of the other.

Eventually, it is possible to think of examples where the search for x resulted in the discovery of y. However, as a rule, lenses that seek x are made so that they fit only for x. That is why the nature must be clarified, not only of musical meaning, but also of the knowledge of that meaning. In this way, it is possible to propose an *adequate* knowledge of meaning in music. This does not exclude the data that can

be discovered by the appropriate lenses for y or z, but only that these lenses deal with aspects other than those engaged in the energetic flow of the affect in question. Perhaps the data of y or z are actually very important, but since they somehow assist in the understanding of x, the energy flow is witnessed in the musical text. It is in this sense that different methods of musical analysis can coexist and present different perspectives of a piece, but only insofar as they can effectively contribute to what the authorial agent - the composer - actually does in the play in his or her conception. A reading of unintended aspects, that is, elements external to the flow of witnessed energy may even be possible, but perhaps the possibility of assigning such meanings to the composer may be questioned, which would ultimately be another ethic but not the ethics of meaning in music.<sup>4</sup>

As a testimony, the musical text thus requires an open attitude to its own meaning, a kind of presumption of innocence. This means an armistice of theories, or lenses, that the text itself does not require for itself. Hence the idea of persuasion and its derived term in Greek, the belief, become important. Somehow it is important to believe that music is doing what it is doing. This may seem a naive attitude in the midst of the current context of readings, which are highly critical and politicized, but this belief does not seem absurd to the very set of basic beliefs of the human being: the belief that when getting out of bed there will be ground; that when speaking the other listens, for instance. Not that such beliefs cannot be mistaken, but precisely because their non-justification would be a disturbance: getting out of bed and not finding the ground or talking and not being heard. For this reason, musical knowledge is defined as a basic belief, such as the recognition of the elementary possibility that what music does is really what it is doing.

Within modern epistemologies, this path does not exactly fit into a rationalist point of view, where the understanding has to be given by logical mechanisms, but also would not find support in empiricism where the sensory has pre-eminence before rational criticism. Perhaps this path is more in line with another modern epistemology known as the Common Sense, a movement that had as its main proponent the Scottish Thomas Reid (1710-1796). Reid starts from the idea of basic beliefs, without which any kind of reasoning or elemental action would be impossible, such as the presumption that the world is real and not an illusion. This is not empiricism because it is not the experience of living in the world that justifies this belief, but an earlier step, that this experience would not even exist if there had not been a leap of credulity before it came

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<sup>4</sup> At this point, it could be interesting to recall the present definition of what music is: „music is what people do in doing musical actions“ (Teixeira; Ferraz, 2018: 3). Following Nicholas Wolterstorff, this definition defines music not as an object or a product, but as a level of human *action*. Musical actions are numerous, but not infinite, e. g. playing, singing, composing, producing, programming, listening; but not acting, cooking, hunting, praying, although those could be instrumentals to musical actions and vice versa.

into existence in this given world. Like rhetorical logic, where persuasion can only be established when a basic belief (a topic) is transferred to the argued thesis, the Common Sense will conceive of knowledge as a transference of belief in increasingly complex basic levels of reality (Wolterstorff, 2001: 221).

The philosopher Alvin Plantinga starts from this argument to question, for example, the belief in the existence of other minds. This belief, even before being justified by any Turing Test, is put into practice in the very act of attributing actions of others to others and not to oneself. It is because others commit actions that we know are not operated by us, that we recognize that those movements depart from a different consciousness than ours (Plantinga apud. Vanhoozer, 1998: 206). This is not a dualism, where it is presumed only a body being manipulated by a puppeteer. When we witness the action of another one, an action of another single body-mind entity is presumed instantaneously. This parallelism is thus a basic belief for existence itself. Similarly, Plantinga asserts, it is a basic belief to assume meaning, insofar as we recognize in actions of other actions of which neither we, nor third parties are responsible, but of that being which produces it. Thus, if the meaning is an intention, directionality set in motion by action, it is reasonable to believe that it exists by the simple fact that such action is witnessed.

This idea clarifies why the search for meaning is only possible when it focuses on the action of an author, for that is where the meaning of fact is made and exists. Meaning is not a creation of perception or a recreation of the performer, who performs a piece, but a given fact put into existence by the authorial agent that means, and this is therefore the act worthy of being known.

Having said that, one question that arises is whether such knowledge can ultimately be determined. That was the question between Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr: there is such a thing as a quantum particle in time and space, but can the position of that particle be known in time *and* space? Again, the main issue may be the question asked: There is a meaning in music, but can this be localized? And this is where the concept of affect becomes so important: this meaning can hardly have its position stabilized because its nature is to move; but its trajectory, this can be known. For this reason, the knowledge of meaning in music is defined not as a topology since it cannot be paralyzed to be known, but as a *kinesiology*, as a description of a movement and its trajectory.

More than just saying what a piece of music means, this possibility proposes to present the direction of the flow of things within which meaning is possible, and can be situated in this affective flow witnessed by the author in his text. And, pointing to directions within which the affective connections are established, directions that are not part of the witnessed energy flow can also be defined, which clarifies why composers such as Berio and Cage, even though they proposed openness to music, still had directions

for which these openings could point. This is also why different interpretations of the same piece may all work in some way to maintain continuity, but some correspond to the author's intention and others do not. And yet, similarly interpretations that in some ways sound so diverse may all be within the same directionality proposed by the composer. Perhaps in this way the comparison of recordings as an analytical model could be made feasible, not as the reading of phenomena, but to the extent that their correspondences could show the direction that gives identity to a certain affective flow of a particular work.

In this flow of affective movements, the role of the interpreter is precisely to place him or herself suitably to the prescribed direction having to sometimes deny his or her own contrary impulses in this encounter with the other. For this reason, this knowledge is ethical insofar as it is made possible with this encounter and in response to it, that is, responsibly. This is an ethic distinct from the one that aspires to use the musical text only as a pretext, for it assumes that there is something anterior, superior or, at least, concurrent with it. However, it is not a question of establishing a passive position to the interpreter, of a blind belief where the performer only follows orders. Rather, the interpreter is a follower who takes his own steps in the direction pointed out by the text, which improvises ways, even creates shortcuts, but always keeping the eyes on the path traced.

Such a sense of knowledge, someone could question, does not provide an absolute knowledge of what a musical piece ultimately does. However, „it is a logical mistake to confuse the possibility of certainty in the understanding with the impossibility of understanding“ (Hirsch apud. Vanhoozer, 1998: 281). There is a middle way between the absolute knowledge and the anarchic knowledge with no direction at all. It is the idea of an *adequate knowledge* of the meaning made in music. In this way, it is feasible that knowledge exists, as reading after reading is updated. In fact, this reading can never be explained, to some extent, because the nature of meaning prevents it from being. Rather than explained, however, that meaning can be inhabited, making the one who knows it share it from inside. Or, as Kevin Vanhoozer rightly puts:

Meaning is the result of a two-way encounter between text and reader (...) meaning is not something that can be 'explained'. On the contrary, understanding is something that happens when the interpreter 'participates' in the text. (VANHOOZER, 1998: 106)

Among so many images already proposed for this relation, of a circle or an interpretative spiral, perhaps an interpretative rhizome could be proposed, a relation of leaps between all discursive entities, with the performance environment, or even with the television turned on outside the practice room. It is an unstable movement, where

the organism erupts in the given spaces, even overlapping some not given, but traveling in a certain direction, an affective phototropy, perhaps a pathotropy.

This act of knowing properly becomes more the gradual unveiling of a path than a compass with the given north beforehand. It is sufficient knowledge to take the next step. And so it needs to be actualized moment by moment, in the same measure as the authorial intention traverses its own affective path. Adequate knowledge is then proposed as the possible kind of knowledge of reality, inasmuch as it is constituted next to the nature of things and not in a rationalizing a posteriori. The concept is presented by Thomas Aquinas as part of the very definition of what truth would be, in the famous proposition of „*adaequatio intellectus et rei*“ (Aquinas, *De Veritas*, Question 1, Article 1), the adequacy of the intellect to reality. Truth brings with it a relational connotation, an idea of a connection between things and individuals, between bodies. Only from the possibility of conformation between individuals and reality can it be possible to affirm knowledge about something, insofar as all instances are affected in the act of knowing. Although Scholastic philosophy gives pre-eminence to the appropriateness of the intellect to reality in this flow of movements, this is not the only possibility. That is why Spinoza overcomes the medieval notion, proposing a notion of adequate knowledge where reality and individual flood each other.

Spinoza conceives knowledge in three genres. The first genus is the one to which „all inadequate and confused ideas belong“, a sensory but superficial knowledge, where the individual stands adrift, being carried by reality without any effort. The second kind of knowledge is the reason, the possibility of organizing reality and dividing it according to the intellect or rationalizing it. In this genre, knowledge can only occur to the extent that reality is apprehended only in what is already possessed of a general idea. There is, finally, the proposition of the third kind of knowledge, an adequate knowledge, where the individual, reality, and transcendence put themselves together in the process of unification, of integral connection. It may be said that the first genus is for anarchic knowledge, the impossibility of direction and sharing, while the second genus is for absolute knowledge, the one that aspires to the final understanding of meaning. Adequate knowledge lies not in the middle, but above these, in the sense that it overcomes the first sensory and rational instincts, opening space for a total experience of reality.

Adequate knowledge is, in a way, the body entering the idea through affect. It is, in fact, an action of knowing, starting from and producing the movement in its own energy. It is reality returning to its origin, to its material principle that in God is one and that in returning to a unity of matter and form in affect, it can be known in its unique essence. Knowledge is adequate not because it can know the ultimate cause of the thing, but because it is carried by the thing itself in its particular energetic flow, which indicates its direction (Deleuze, 1988). The knowledge of music must be adequate, because, ultimately, its very existence occurs in an action of adequacy. It is

not a previous spiritual idea that is materialized in the work simply, but rather the notion of a substance that becomes substance at the very moment of its existence, in its own becoming. Even so, it is felt that artistic creation is a constant meditative act, an esoteric mystical contact. Rather, it is an extremely physical, material process where notes, sounds, and gestures are chosen, created, set side by side. It is in this materiality that the becoming of music takes place. In choosing sounds and movements there is a process of *humanization* of sounds and movements that would otherwise be scattered only in the clouds of virtualities of reality. It is „as the artist works with his chosen medium, he gradually comes to know it“ (Wolterstorff, 1980: 91). In the craft of the composition or in the construction of a performance knowledge is an action where moment to moment the material is teaching the craftsman its own limits and forms in being wrought.

In its becoming, music creates its own plan of immanence, its own relation of fittingness, of materials taking form, assuming its position and its relation with the others. And it is in those connections between materials that the meaning proper to each discourse can be known. It is in this sense that a work fits reality when coming to the existence that the knowledge needs to obey the same logic and to seek relations of fittingness within the discourse. “Fittingness is the cross-modal similarity” (Wolterstorff, 1980: 99). Thus, the *piano* can only be *piano* in relation to its own dynamic plane; the high register only has its tone contour in its own plan of pitches; the noise only sounds as such in its own morphological plane. Finally, the inner logic of a piece provides the tools themselves to be understood and interpreted, for it is in this plane that they are meant to mean.

The adequate knowledge of the authorial testimony fixed in the score is then made in the order of the movement and the internal adaptations in the plane of the textual marks. As so, the score is the testimony of a dialogue between composer and performer. Of this, follows that the recipient of the musical text is the *performer* and not the listener, the critic or the analyst. For this reason, the knowledge that can be obtained should be that made possible by the composer, in dialogue. The becoming of the text is to become sound through movements and it is in that order that it operates, modulating affects and, with that, energizing actions that will give permanence to those affections.

The temper of the ink, the crooked line of the *glissando*, each sign of the score affects the interpreter and leads to a specific type of action. It is not a purely intellectual understanding, of necessarily turning a certain symbol into a certain sound, because, finally, no interpreter has ultimate control over the sound. The performer can, at best, control his or her movements. Movement is the only bridge to access sound (Lortat-Jacob, 2010). And, since music is what people do in doing musical actions, it is not an accidental problem that the affective flow has to go through the resistance of writing and, later, through the resistance of the performance. These steps are part of music itself being music. What is necessary is that knowledge could be known also in this order, because this is the only thing that music can offer.

*How do we know? Empathy and perceptual action*

The rhetorical *pathos*, when taken in its affective meaning, becomes then the epistemological principle par excellence, not only for discourse in general but especially for musical discourse, due to the nature of its meaning. However, even after understanding how affect establishes connections between bodies, it remains to know the specific mechanism through which individuals and actions can connect distinct instances of this *pathos*.

A term as old as *pathos* is used for reference to this connection, which is empathy. The term even brings in the English language the original Greek root, of *empathia*, with the prefix *em* denoting the feel in, or affecting in. Empathy means, then, this possibility of affectation in the other, of an affective connection.

However, although the term of Greek origin has such a clear meaning, it has become the translation of a concept coined in Germany at the end of the nineteenth century, the *Einfühlung*, with reasonably more complex implications. The German term is composed of the prefix *Ein*, which designates a movement towards, and the radical *Fühlung*, which designates an intensive contact. The *Einfühlung* is, therefore, this strong movement of connection. The concept first appears in the philosopher Robert Vischer (1847-1933), in his doctoral thesis *On the optical sense of form: a contribution to aesthetics* (1873), although he attributes his understanding to his father, the philosopher Friedrich Theodor Vischer (1807-1887) (Vischer, 1993 [1873]: 89). In his thesis, Vischer advocates the idea that when individuals are presented to an external body, they strive to make that reality fits their own body constitution, i.e., its form. In the act of knowing there is a conformational effort, a projection of the self in the other, or the other thing and, in the same way, a projection of the other in oneself. The thought of Robert Vischer, it is worth mentioning, is eminently a physiological relation from the physiological point of view, where this effort changes the whole configuration of the optic nerve in this effort. It is in this sense that empathy is very much in advance of its popular notion. It is not about an effort of understanding or charitable compassion, but really about an affection, a movement of impact in oneself and in the other, being born as a concept already in the scope of the artistic experience.

After Vischer's propositions, the concept was further developed in the studies of the German philosopher Theodor Lipps (1851-1914), one of Freud's greatest influences. Lipps considers more broadly the role of movement in empathy and how the gesture that is perceived penetrates the one who perceives with such force that he sees himself as the author of the movement. In this quotation, he strives to materialize this understanding:

I feel this striving of mine within the visually perceived movement. I experience it as something belonging directly to it. Thus I feel myself striving within this movement, striving for the kinesthetic sense of motion that corresponds to the visually perceived movement, and with it for this movement itself. To put it more generally, I feel myself within a thing perceived, striving to execute a movement. (LIPPS, apud CURTIS, 2014: 356)

Lipps makes this perceptual effort almost palpable, from perception to action. It is easy to see this dimension in music, both when the performance, in its chain of movements, itself constitutes a set of efforts that capture the audience, and in the fact that the musical sound itself is implied by an energy stimulus that reacts in movement. „Life is energy“ (Lipps apud. Curtis, 2014: 359). It is simpler, therefore, to understand the sensitive and communicative dimension of empathy as a mechanism of affection. Empathy is active, affective and, for this reason, it is not sympathy. It is not a question of feeling with the other, but of a relation of extensions where the bodies try to modulate themselves.

The concept of empathy will take on new impetus from the emblematic book *Abstraktion und Einfühlung* [Abstraction and Empathy] by Wilhelm Wörringer (1881-1965). The epistemological principle is developed in the sense that, in contact with reality, there is a perceptive movement so that reality can be perceived. So our perception of reality consists basically of two types of movement: a movement favorable to the movement of reality, or a positive empathy; or on the other hand, an opposite and unfavorable movement to that demanded by reality, resulting in a negative empathy (Wörringer, 1997 [1908]: 6). It seems already clear that the rhetorical scope of the concept, since keeping the audience connected to discourse is one of the main roles of *pathos* in rhetoric. In this sense, one cannot understand epistemology as a direct movement, where a speaker sends a message to a receiver; it is about a constant movement of exchange, an immediate response, moment by moment, as when the teacher speaks louder by observing the yawns of the students. This human effort, from the social point of view, is actually a reproduction of the inner effort of the human being in relation to reality; the energy that each entity employs in the internal movement to keep within the discourses that are put to him varies from each one and can never be reproduced, whatever the order of meaning or power. When in contact with musical abstraction, or the absence of previous references in the listener's repertoire, perception is seen in a chaotic movement of rapid empathetic jumps, of positive and negative stimuli that follow each other rapidly, this, of course, in the hypothesis of a successful discourse in its composition and performance. In the contemporary musical discourse all beings are agents and all are invited from moment to moment to feel in the other, to share the

affective dimension communicated by each one.<sup>5</sup> Not like the Freudian *Einfühlung* that only aimed to understand the others for analyzing them with detachment, but a real epistemology of exchange between bodies.

From the establishment of this mechanism of knowledge, it is evident that the human relationship with music itself should be reconsidered. The Platonic ideal of a contemplative life still permeates the attitudes of those who just want to sit in their chairs and receive music in their ears. Current music has rescued an earlier aspect of an active life, where all the parts of the action of music making are present. This inversion is a radical reconfiguration of vectors, for the old Aesthetics, which only seeks the ascetic contemplation of a transcendent value, of a Beauty, giving way to affective action, to empathy in all its force and form. It is a matter of dismissing the disinterested perception and putting the whole being at the service of musical action, involving it in its entirety (Wolterstorff, 2015: 11).

Gilbert Simondon (1924-1989) proposes a kind of techno-aesthetics, an attitude of satisfaction in the proper functioning of artistic actions and not in their contemplation (Simondon, 2012: 3). Simondon recognizes the need to reverse the interpretive vector, to think of the affective relationships from the first energetic stimulus, that is, the composer, and not from a passive listening. The suitability of the hand for a particular choice of fingering may be just as satisfying as the sound result of that choice. In fact, it is in the processes of satisfaction of artistic actions that something artistic is done. It is about enjoying the process of actions and not considering such profane steps before the sacred art object. One must sanctify the very act of music to become.

The sculptures of the Prophets, by Aleijadinho, are the destiny of contemplation in Congonhas, Brazil, the consummation of an aesthetic experience. However, the chapels of passion are forgotten, the stations placed in the steep climb of pebbles. It is not a question of stopping in front of the sculptures to observe them. Rather, it is necessary to take the steps from chapel to chapel and, in some way, to make the effort of Jesus who carries the cross; to tread upon his bruises stone after stone. It is a matter of striving in going to the next chapel, in order to produce an actual expenditure of energy so that it can be reached. The paths of stone are as much works of art as any sculpture there. The path enables empathy, not only to observe Jesus who walks to death but also to carry his/one's own cross, finally putting all suffering, all *pathos* before the Eucharistic Christ in the Sanctuary.

*What do we know? Stimmung and the projection of a world*

Defining the knowledge of meaning in music from the concepts such as affection and empathy may sound reasonable, taking into account the argumentation developed. However, it remains to be clarified to what extent this type of postulate

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<sup>5</sup> This is an idea also present in the Psychological principle of appetitive and aversive motivations.

surpasses the understanding of a purely subjective perception. Perhaps the first point to be made explicit, though already suggested, is that the concept of affect is based on the assumption of a bodily unity that affects and is affected and not a duality of body and soul or idea and appearance. Thus, human experience occurs in the processes of creation of the very existence of an entire being, that is, in life. And, being part of life, it also gives the meaning and possibility of their knowledge in music.

In defining the role of Henri Bergson's philosophy in Gilles Deleuze's thought, Henriques places the problem with a terminological correctness:

(...) we must proceed here with the utmost care. For to say that the universe is in some measure immanent to us is not to reduce it to the small dimensions of our subjectivity, making it a content of our individual *psyche*. On the contrary: what is at stake (...) is the realization that immanence is something far greater than our consciousness, the idea that the interiority of each of us goes beyond the limits of our small self. In the present case, this leads to the assertion that in the depths of our subjectivity there is not the subject, but the *world* itself, with its anonymous and dormant duration, with its full becoming that precedes all subjective consciousness. Indeed, in this zone of limitation of immanence, which is the material universe, every idea of an individual omniscience loses meaning, since we are before a world that precedes all psychological and even biological individuation. When we reach this zero degree of duration, which is the material universe, we necessarily enter an anonymous, impersonal ground, a kind of *pre-subjective transcendental field*. (HENRIQUES, 2016: 45)

It is exactly in this field that the possibility of speaking of a meaningful data in music lies, which makes not only its meaning possible but its knowledge and communion too. This is not because of a Gnostic faculty, on the contrary, it is because its nature predates the very rationalization of the individual.

This understanding led Heidegger to coin a fundamental concept in his philosophy, the *Stimmung*, unfortunately, another German term difficult to translate due to its multiplicity of possible meanings, but of essential definition. Some translations have been suggested for English, such as mood, tuning, or atmosphere. The latter two have the merit of representing the real, common and at the same time invisible characteristic which *Stimmung* possesses. However, although real, it is not a dimension of reality so easily perceived by the physical senses and much less measurable by any type of technology.

The *Stimmung* is a dimension of the real but in the context named by Heidegger as the pre-existence (or the *Da* of *Dasein*). It is an emotional reality that allows emotions

to exist. In fact, a kind of atmosphere that allows each one to breathe and live. However, each one „breathes“ *Stimmung* in his own way. Each one has contact with this aspect of reality and experiences it in a different way. It can be said that a piece of music listened to caused tension in a person; in another recalled a sad passage from childhood; in short, each one can experience the same piece in a different way. But there is an undeniable fact: everyone experiences something. Like a tree that bears fruits of different sizes, colors, and even distinct flavors, each one can associate and understand the tree in a different way, because of the fruit that he harvested. In the same way, a statement can be made: there is such a thing as the tree. The *Stimmung* calls this dimension of sensation that reality possesses, that each one can live differently, but that, finally, lives. This, it may be said, is the propositional content that music can contain. The referentiality of music is limited to the indices and their intersemiosis. Music as an entity by itself has a meaning, but we do not live in an agnosticism where that meaning hangs in the air, but cannot be understood. Perhaps no one can, in fact, possess a full knowledge of this meaning. However, this does not mean that we cannot have some knowledge, which is sufficient for a discourse, in this case, the musical, to be part of our existence and we exist in it, within that exchange ratio.

Speaking of *Stimmung*, this possibility of an affective reality in music is not exactly a novelty, and was already suggested by Guido Adler during his seminal article *The scope, method, and goal of musicology* of 1885. Adler stated that „The determination of the affective substance [*des Stimmungsgehaltes*], the aesthetic content, can be seen as the touchstone of critical reflection“ (Adler; Muggleston, 1991 [1885]: 7). As visionary as this statement may have been, it may be its conclusion, where Adler ponders that „in most cases, however, it will be a futile effort to try to translate this into words“ (Ibid.).

This impossibility is no longer a subterfuge of sublimation, but the opening of a new possibility, more immediate and, to some extent, more common than the fact rationally interpreted. In describing the two poles generally adopted, Heidegger presents his defense to escape from both, concluding, „irrationalism, as the counterpart of rationalism, talks about the things to which rationalism is blind, but only with a squint“ (Heidegger, 2010 [1926]: 132). The evidence to affirm such a dimension of reality can be no other than existence and therefore this dimension is the final validation of existence itself. It is the sense of being, that even if apparently apathetic, it is not the absence of a being in being affected, but only a being-affected repulsively. Thus, music dwells more fully in this dimension of reality and, finally, it shows even more abundantly that the being affected exists in the world – the being lives.

This vision, before sentimentalizing the content of music and romanticizing its existence, follows another path, that of considering sensation rather than feeling. It is not a question of establishing a logically structured compendium of sensations, which is generally the case in many of the discourses on music. Rather, we consider the need

to seek an integral understanding and, for this, to use the integral being. It is a matter of recognizing the limitation of logical (and musicological) discourse and, in doing so, of broadening it to an integral, sensitive knowledge, where mind and hands meet in the consummation of musical knowledge.

Actually, the very term *Stimmung* owes to music its meaning, in the sense in which it is constructed from the musical voice, *Stimme*. Rather than being perception or expression, *Stimmung* is the condition for such things to exist (Ratcliffe, 2013: 159). It is a dimension of the real and not an emotional experience or intent. However, care must be taken that *Stimmung* is not readily admitted to being. Within this plane of immanence, it is the condition for the sensation in the same measure in which to feel the beings to constitute. In this sense, rationalist individualism must be overcome, because the concept demands a certain degree of community and, for this reason, it cannot be attributed the responsibility of perpetrating subjectivation, because it does not even admit disentangling between the subjects and an objective reality. Rather, it postulates that in being, beings constitute such a reality and, because they constitute it, one can admit such thing as its existence, through sensation.

This effort to define is legitimized as part of a critical reflection on what ultimately happens in music making. Not that it abdicates any thematic or referential reflection, but the question is to focus on what finally leads music to exist, that is the movement of sonorous bodies and, therefore, it is the primary musical action that constitutes the dimension in question. It is for this reason that this knowledge does not stick to the particular because it is based on a pre-subjective dimension: it is what a performer does before even his mind leads him through the guidelines of execution, analytical approaches or any other interpretative resource. It is the interpretation in the *performer* before even the interpretation of the *performer*. Kevin Vanhoozer puts this question interestingly:

Music conveys one's sense, conditioned but not determined by time and culture, of what it is „to be in the world.“ Being-in-the-world involves both a grasp of one's environment and of oneself: of one's place in the world and of one's possibilities. What music conveys, then, is not so much a message as it is a mood. Martin Heidegger prefers to speak of 'mood' rather than ethos, but both terms refer to a person's sense of being-in-the-world. The German term for 'mood' (*Stimmung*) originally referred to the tuning of a musical instrument, which may be why Heidegger also speaks of 'being attuned'. Mood thus involves one's sense of self, one's sense of the world, and the relation between them (the „tuning“). Because music always conveys some sense of being-in-the-world, all music is 'mood' music. (VANHOOZER, 2004: 114)

Thus, music has this ability to build an affective world, not in a metaphorical but in an actual sense, for it is indeed real here, that beings feel and share. In this sense, different pieces of music differ both in the way they construct a world and in the kind of world they construct, and for that reason, it may be nowadays, in a period of so much fragmentation of musical structures that this understanding is emerging again. Because listening is built into the discourse, due to the lack of nexus between what has been produced and the inner reality, and the construction of the affective world of a piece has sedimented its unique space.

Paul Ricoeur puts this construction very precisely when, referring especially to the music of Messiaen, he speaks of an action of *refiguration* (Ricoeur, 2001: 260). The artistic act does not simply create a configuration, a material representation of the world and with the world; rather, it projects and imagines a new figuration of reality in its affects and sensations, refiguring the world after it. Only through the *logos*, of a material and fixed presentation, is it possible to have access to this affective dimension, but the figurations are not the dimension. Nor are they a mere index of this dimension, but they are their own incarnation, in every musical figure written or every gesture put into action by the performer. This is the reason why different pieces or different performances can at each occasion be new and present a new affective reality and, at the same time, be the same piece, a same authorial intention. “The work of art refers to an emotion that disappeared as an emotion, but was preserved as a work” (Ricoeur, 1996: 2). Each artistic action recreates an affect and reconnects to a *Stimmung*.

That is why Monet creates and recreates his *Nymphéas*, the many aquatic plants that in their many species and colors are refigured in painting after painting. It is not a romanticized dialectic, *alla* Heraclitus, to oppose the transitoriness between object and subject, between landscape and painter, but to understand the figuration of a whole, of the sensations put at stake in the *momentum* of each artistic action.

These actions place the being in the midst of a discursive flow as *being-affected*, an absolutely transient arrangement where the whole body is placed in a position to be moved and reconditioned. Music opens in the being-affected an unspeakable sensation space. In this sense, beings share affects in all the vectors of the discourse, from the composer to the performer or among listeners; but this sharing may be less for communication and more for a contagion, a spreading of movements. Rhetorically speaking, adherence to musical discourse is less a matter of sharing the same motivation of the author in his intention and more a walk (with one’s own strength) in the directions suggested by the affective movements.

Nicholas Wolterstorff understands this process of refiguration as a *world projection*. Musical actions - playing, singing, composing, programming, etc. - produce their own world of possibilities, their plane of immanence where such actions induce a listening, an experience and, at the same time, constitute their intrinsic relations of

fittingness and gradations, of extremes and polarizations (Wolterstorff, 1980a: 222). It is in this sense that the actions produce their particular *Stimmung*, since the same figure, the same musical writing, has its meaning in the localized act; in the discourse flow in which a certain figure is inserted, its movement gains momentum. A figure never produces the same gesture, for each occurrence comes from distinct dynamics, distinct positions on the fingerboard, distinct positions at the bow, distinct finger combinations. In short, a figure will never produce the same gesture and therefore will never have the same meaning. And in this local combination of actions, the musical discourse emerges with its *Stimmung*, projecting a world, which is real, for it inhabits reality and makes the bodies of discourse participating in this world to dwell.

*What is propositional in music?*

Passion, affect, sensation, empathy, and *Stimmung*. There are many terms to try to define the knowledge of meaning in music. But it is from limit concepts that it seems more appropriate to define musical knowledge, without resolving it in conceptual absolutisms or in an activity that cannot contribute to music making, which should be the objective, the end of any discourse on music.

From J. L. Austin's formula for meaning as  $F(p)$ , as the product of an illocutionary force ( $F$ ) on a proposition ( $p$ ), it is possible to consider a relation between the terms presented. Thinking of music as *what people do in doing musical actions*, the proposition is precisely the sound set in motion from this mediation, whether textual, mnemonic or any other recording instance. However, this moving sound cannot be reduced to a physical-acoustic description, since musical actions have purposes and, when placed in discourse, have community attributes, responsibilities and responses to the other.

A verbal proposition is nothing more than signs operating in reference to meaning. In music, what guarantees a musical figuration, the possibility of meaning, is not its reference to an object or a concept, but to the affective reality, to the *Stimmung* within which it is made. It is not about pointing to a *Stimmung*, but about dwelling and being made in it. Thus, in a process of refiguration, musical figurations assume the status of a proposition by embodying reality. Given the very nature of reality, this meaning can only be known in its own affective order, or empathically. The musical proposition, by definition, cannot be known rationally or logically, but „pathically.“ And as it is placed in this pre-subjective statute it can be affirmed that the knowledge goes beyond the mere subjective feeling. However, the proposition, the  $p$  of the function of meaning, is not the only term of this formula. A force is needed that does something with such a proposition. To retrieve an infamous example, it is not enough to describe semantically, syntactically or etymologically the „yes“ said on the matrimonial altar, unless one considers what is

being done with the term: a promise. People do things with words, just as people do things with music. Not in a utilitarian or sociological sense, but rather, in a sense of fulfilling their becoming-in-the-world and therefore affecting and being affected.

Thus affect assumes this illocutionary agency in music, of doing something in itself and in the other, or of making the reality of existence. The affect triggers the composer to write and the performer moves in response to the musical text. It is only from this force that the proposition gains meaning and presents the projection of an affective world. Perhaps it is in this sense that Deleuze places the pathology of the arts as the consummation of the three repetitions, of the temporal dimensions of the world, and of being in it. „Repetition is pathos, and the philosophy of repetition is pathology“ (Deleuze, 2000: 272). It is in the rhizomatic relation of discourse, between composition, performance and listening, that affects are constructed and reconstructed. In the singular moment of the performance, the times overlap: the compositional process, the process of construction of the interpretation, the way to the concert. In short, all experiences are added in the very existence from the musical action. And it is in this sense that music can point to the third repetition, the third and last dance of eternity.

In the beginning was chaos. Chaos is part of reality and perhaps everything is, in fact, an emergency of chaos, as Contemporary Music makes it appear to be. But as soon as the chaos was done, God proceeded with his first utterance: *fiat lux*, let there be light. The Bible says that Jesus is the light; the Illuminists said that Reason was the light. The fact is that, even in chaos, there is light to make things known; it is a possible knowledge, although not absolute of the musical meaning, even in the contemporary repertoire. However, this is not merely intellectual knowledge, which can be exhausted in words; it is a living, lived knowledge, a knowledge practiced in actions; it is an ethical knowledge.

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### Afeksi haosa: Retorički patos i epistemologija muzičkog diskursa

**Apstrakt:** Ovaj rad predlaže sistematično promišljanje o tome kako izvođenja otelovljavaju ne samo predložene načine izlaganja nego i projekcije afektivnih svetova, pri čemu pokušava da izbegne objektivizaciju ljudi i osećanja u korist pokretnog i fluidnog osećaja za značenje. Ovo promišljanje je uglavnom okrenuto ka realnosti muzičkog diskursa, naročito savremenog, gde izgleda prevladava nedostatak konsenzusa, ali koje prožima sve umetnosti koje, na neki način, sagledavaju istu trenutnu situaciju u izvođačkom činu. Počinje diskusijom o *patosu (pathos)* u filozofiji, pokušavajući da prati njegov razvoj kroz istoriju, a završava se njegovom latinskom formom u vidu *afekta (affectus)*. Oba pojma se odnose na rasprave o tome šta sada znači umetnički diskurs i kako je moguće to spoznati, oslanjajući se na koncepte poput *shodnosti (fittingness)*, *empatije (empathy)* i *štimunga (Stimmung)*, na koje upućuje misao filozofa poput Žila Deleza (Gilles Deleuze), Nikolasa Volterstorfa (Nicholas Wolterstorff), Martina Hajdegera (Martin Heidegger) kao i antička obnovljena umetnost retorike.

**Ključne reči:** savremena muzika, muzička retorika, muzičko izvođenje, epistemologija, muzički gest.