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Filtros : "International Journal of Game Theory" Removido: "TEORIA DOS JOGOS" Limpar

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  • Artigo de periodico

    Mergers and acquisitions with conditional and unconditional ofers (2020)

    Gomes, Armando; Maldonado, Wilfredo Fernando Leiva

    Source: International Journal of Game Theory. Unidade: FEA

    Assunto: ECONOMIA

    Acesso à fonteAcesso à fonteDOIHow to cite
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    • ABNT

      GOMES, Armando e MALDONADO, Wilfredo Fernando Leiva. Mergers and acquisitions with conditional and unconditional ofers. International Journal of Game Theory, v. 49, n. 3, p. 773-800, 2020Tradução . . Disponível em: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00720-6. Acesso em: 21 out. 2025.

    • APA

      Gomes, A., & Maldonado, W. F. L. (2020). Mergers and acquisitions with conditional and unconditional ofers. International Journal of Game Theory, 49( 3), 773-800. doi:10.1007/s00182-020-00720-6

    • NLM

      Gomes A, Maldonado WFL. Mergers and acquisitions with conditional and unconditional ofers [Internet]. International Journal of Game Theory. 2020 ; 49( 3): 773-800.[citado 2025 out. 21 ] Available from: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00720-6

    • Vancouver

      Gomes A, Maldonado WFL. Mergers and acquisitions with conditional and unconditional ofers [Internet]. International Journal of Game Theory. 2020 ; 49( 3): 773-800.[citado 2025 out. 21 ] Available from: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00720-6

  • Artigo de periodico

    On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many to may buyer seller markets (2017)

    Pérez-Castrillo, J. David; Sotomayor, Marilda Antonia de Oliveira

    Source: International Journal of Game Theory. Unidade: FEA

    Subjects: EQUILÍBRIO ECONÔMICO, COMPETIÇÃO ECONÔMICA

    Acesso à fonteAcesso à fonteDOIHow to cite
    A citação é gerada automaticamente e pode não estar totalmente de acordo com as normas

    • ABNT

      PÉREZ-CASTRILLO, J. David e SOTOMAYOR, Marilda Antonia de Oliveira. On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many to may buyer seller markets. International Journal of Game Theory, v. no 2017, n. 4, p. 1137-1161, 2017Tradução . . Disponível em: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0573-y. Acesso em: 21 out. 2025.

    • APA

      Pérez-Castrillo, J. D., & Sotomayor, M. A. de O. (2017). On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many to may buyer seller markets. International Journal of Game Theory, no 2017( 4), 1137-1161. doi:10.1007/s00182-017-0573-y

    • NLM

      Pérez-Castrillo JD, Sotomayor MA de O. On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many to may buyer seller markets [Internet]. International Journal of Game Theory. 2017 ; no 2017( 4): 1137-1161.[citado 2025 out. 21 ] Available from: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0573-y

    • Vancouver

      Pérez-Castrillo JD, Sotomayor MA de O. On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many to may buyer seller markets [Internet]. International Journal of Game Theory. 2017 ; no 2017( 4): 1137-1161.[citado 2025 out. 21 ] Available from: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0573-y
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